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Innkeeper’s Liability for Loss Suffered by Guests: 
Drake v Dow
Drake v Dow1 is concerned with the issue of strict liability attributed to innkeepers for 
loss suffered by guests. The case also contains an entertaining foray into the historical 
development of the law of delict in Scotland and may therefore be of interest to legal 
historians.
A. THE FACTS
In 2004, Mr Drake resided at Castlehill Bed and Breakfast, Tain, for a period of eight 
months while waiting to be housed by a local authority. On the night of 30 August, 
while the proprietors of the B & B were away on holiday, Mr Drake’s newly acquired 
computer was stolen from his room while he slept. The doors of the bedrooms within 
the establishment did not have locks.
Mr Drake maintained that the proprietors, Mr and Mrs Dow, were liable for his 
loss. They denied liability and the matter came before the sheriff on 20 January 2005. 
Mr Drake, who represented himself, made a claim that a delict “in the concept of 
onus” had been committed. When he was questioned by the sheriff as to the meaning 
of this statement, it transpired that Mr Drake was relying on nautae caupones stabu-
larii, a particular part of the praetorian edict which, he claimed, had been received into 
Scots law. It rendered, amongst others, an innkeeper strictly liable for loss incurred in 
respect of property brought into the establishment. After considering this argument, 
the sheriff dismissed Mr Drake’s claim on procedural grounds, for failure to set out 
the basis of his claim. In his judgment, the sheriff also raised doubts as to whether 
Mr Drake’s claim was founded on sound law and remarked that, even if the claim 
had been properly set out, it would probably not have succeeded. The pursuer was 
ordered to pay the defenders’ costs.
Mr Drake appealed against this decision to the sheriff principal. When the appeal 
was heard, the pursuer again maintained that he was relying on the edict nautae 
caupones stabularii. Citing a passage from Walker on Delict,2 he argued that the edict 
had been received into Scots law and maintained that it applied, not only to inns, but 
also to lodging and boarding houses such as Castlehill B & B. In support of this exten-
sion of the edict, two cases were relied on: May v Wingate3 and Watling v McDowall.4 
Reference was also made to a South African decision, Gabriel and Another v Enchanted 
Bed and Breakfast CC.5  The solicitor for the defenders contended that the edict only 
1 2006 GWD 21-461. The sheriff principal’s opinion is available at http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/opinions/
SC3704.html.
2 D M Walker, The Law of Delict in Scotland, 2nd edn, revised (1981) 291-295.
3 (1694) Mor 9236.
4 (1825) 4 S 86.
5 2002 (6) SA 597 (C). The pursuer also argued that, in any event, the proprietors of the establishment 
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applied to inns and not to lodging houses. Given the pursuer’s length stay, it was 
claimed that he was a lodger and that the edict therefore did not apply.
The sheriff principal6 was unpersuaded by the pursuer’s case. After analysing a 
statement from Erskine’s Institute,7 on which the pursuer chiefl y relied for his exten-
sion of the edict to lodging houses, along with a number of cases, the sheriff principal 
found against the pursuer, in the following words:8
In my opinion, whatever may have been the position in 1694 or 1800, it cannot be affi rmed, 
in particular in the face of the reservation of the Court of Session in Watling v McDowall in 
1825, that it is the law of Scotland that the proprietor of a bed and breakfast establishment 
may be liable under the Praetorian Edict to make good loss sustained by a guest (such as the 
pursuer in this case) while staying at that establishment. It follows in my view that the sheriff 
in the present case correctly dismissed the action on the basis that the pursuer’s claim was 
not soundly based in law.
The sheriff principal then proceeded to give another reason for his decision.9 
Section 1(1) of the Hotel Proprietors Act 1956 provides that only a hotel (as defi ned 
in that Act) is an inn;10 and since Castlehill B & B did not constitute a hotel within 
the Act, it could not be an inn.11 The South African case was said to be irrelevant.12 
Although the sheriff principal had not read it, he felt that the situations were too dispa-
rate to compare, and that a similar claim against the proprietor of a bed and breakfast 
establishment in Scotland would probably have been defeated by section 1(1) of the 
Hotel Proprietors Act of 1956.13
B. ANALYSIS
In Roman law, the historical foundation of this aspect of Scots law, innkeepers 
(caupones) were the subject of a number of legal rules. Digest 4.9, entitled “Let 
seamen, innkeepers, and stable keepers restore what they have received”, granted 
special praetorian remedies against these categories of people. It is generally agreed 
that this Digest title contains three distinct actions, introduced for different purposes.14 
were negligent in not having locks on the doors. The sheriff principal refused to entertain this argument 
(para 18) on the basis that it was not raised before the sheriff, and was not adequately represented either 
in the stated case or in the grounds of appeal.
6 Sir Stephen S T Young QC.
7 Erskine, Inst 3.1.28.
8 Para 25.
9 Paras 26 and 27.
10 See the defi nition of a hotel in s 1(3) of this Act.
11 The logic of this argument is questionable: the classifi cation of all hotels as inns in terms of this Act does 
not mean that all inns are hotels.
12 Para 28.
13 The relationship between this Act and edictal liability needs to be resolved.
14 See J Mackintosh, “Nautae caupones stabularii: special liabilities of shipmaster, innkeepers, and stablers” 
(1935) 47 JR 54; D S Bogen, “Ignoring history: the liability of ships’ Masters, innkeepers and stablekeep-
ers under Roman Law” (1992) 36 AJLH 326, for a survey of older literature and a credible account of 
the reasons for the amalgamation of these different actions into one Digest title. The Roman law posi-
tion is also summarised in R Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian 
Tradition (1990) 514-520. The most recent account is R Zimmermann and P Simpson, “Strict liability”, 
in K Reid and R Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law in Scotland vol 2 (2000) 569-583.
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The fi rst, the main subject of D 4.9, is the actio de recepto (receptum being the Latin 
term for a “guarantee”). This action rendered the innkeeper strictly liable for loss 
suffered15 by those staying in his inn, irrespective of whether he or his staff had been 
at fault. The Roman jurists rationalised the existence of this action in terms of the fear 
that the innkeeper and his staff or other guests could collude to rob an unsuspecting 
traveller, but this may have been an ex post facto justifi cation. The basis of the strict 
liability imposed upon the innkeeper was a guarantee to keep the goods of his guests 
safe. There is evidence that the guarantee originally had to be expressly stated, but 
in classical Roman law it had come to be implied. Once the guarantee had become 
implied, the extent of the innkeeper’s liability was restricted to exclude cases of vis 
maior.16 It is important to note that this action did not dwell on the cause of the 
loss (apart from the exclusion of unforeseen and uncontrollable force). Its aim was to 
compensate the guest for loss in whatever manner it had been caused, whether by the 
innkeeper acting in collusion with his employees or by other guests. It should also be 
noted that the Roman jurists did not defi ne an inn, nor did they make any statements 
on the length of stay. It may well be that a relatively short period of stay was implied 
in the semantics of the word “inn”, but this is not authoritatively settled.
The second action briefl y mentioned in this Digest title is a variant of the action 
on theft (actio furti against nautae, caupones, stabularii).17 Its purpose was rather 
different from the actio de recepto, although the rationale for its introduction appears 
to have been similar if not identical. The innkeeper was held liable for double the value 
of any object stolen, irrespective of fault. Unlike the actio de recepto, the cause of the 
loss was of prime importance in this action. The victim had to prove that the object had 
been stolen by the staff of the innkeeper or by lodgers (as opposed to passing travellers 
for whom the innkeeper was not liable). A variation on this action dealt with damage 
caused by the staff of the innkeeper or lodgers living on the premises (the actio damni 
against nautae, caupones, stabularii).
The route whereby these actions were received into Scots law is bound up with 
the history of the European ius commune. Almost no research has been done on their 
fate in the medieval ius commune and their development until the sixteenth century 
when they were most likely received into Scots law.18 With that said, a few cautious 
remarks are possible. The famous Accursian gloss, which contains a reliable account 
of perceived medieval interpretation of Roman law, distinguished between the actio 
de recepto, based quasi ex contractu, and the actio furti against nautae, caupones, 
stabularii, based quasi ex malefi cio.19 Although this has not been comprehensively 
explored, it would suggest that this distinction was generally maintained throughout 
the subsequent development of the ius commune until the sixteenth century. That 
the distinction between the two actions became embedded in the ius commune can, 
for example, be deduced from the famous seventeenth-century Roman-Dutch jurist, 
Johannes Voet who, in his Commentarius ad Pandectas, clearly followed the Accursian 
15 Only the value of the object could be claimed.
16 Zimmermann, Obligations (n 14) 515.
17 Mainly treated in D.47.5.
18 Zimmermann & Simpson (n 14) at 570.
19 See the Accursian Gloss to the title of D.4.9 in Corpus Glossatorum Iuris Civilis vol 7 (Turin, 1969).
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distinction.20
The degree of lucidity in the ius commune as to the different foundations of 
these two actions makes the confusion of the Scottish institutional writers on the 
edict somewhat curious.21 Since these authors did not generally quote the sources on 
which their discussions were based, the precise origin of the confusion may never be 
uncovered. Fortunately, some of the groundwork has now been done. In a detailed 
survey of the reception of the edict into Scots law, Zimmermann and Simpson have 
demonstrated the complexities of the situation.22 It seems that the actio de recepto, 
based on quasi-contract, was received into Scots law rather than the action on theft 
against nautae, caupones, stabularii.23 Although the institutional writers seem to have 
conceived of it as an action based on strict liability, their discussions focused on what 
at fi rst sight appear to be situations that would have been dealt with by the other two 
actions (theft and destruction of property by the staff of the innkeeper or by guests). 
This should not be overstated, however, since it is diffi cult to envisage loss (as covered 
by the edict) occurring in another way. Owing to the quasi-contractual foundation of 
the action, it became more closely associated with the contract of deposit (especially 
given the wording of the edict) and much attention was paid to whether the property 
had been “received” and whether the innkeeper had tacitly consented to keeping the 
goods safe.24 With the advent of the nineteenth century, however, restrictive tenden-
cies are apparent in court decisions on the action.25  Thus, for example, the courts 
seemed reluctant to grant this action in the absence of fault (an indication that it had 
all but become part of the contract of deposit), or where consent of the innkeeper 
could not be proved. Zimmermann and Simpson take a rather pessimistic view of the 
future of this action in Scots law. They argue that it has practically been fused with the 
contract of deposit and that statutory regulation of sea trade and hotels has severely 
limited its scope, effectively rendering it obsolete.26
20 See Voet’s discussion on D 4.9 and D 47.5 in J Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas, translated by Percival 
Gane as The Selective Voet: being selections on the Pandects, 8 vols (1955-1958).
21 See, amongst others, Stair, Inst 1.9.5, 1.13.3, 1.44.4; Bankton, Inst 1.16.1; Erskine, Inst 3.1.28, Bell, Prin 
§ 236; Bell, Comm I, 495; Hume, Lectures III, 417.
22 Zimmermann & Simpson (n 14). It seems, however, that this work was not placed before the court in 
Drake v Dow.
23 Zimmermann & Simpson (n 14) at 570-572. It is, however, necessary to be cautious about the authors’ 
view that only one of the two actions was received into Scots law. In fact, a case could be made, especially 
from a careful reading of Stair, Inst 1.9.5 (actio furti?) and 1.13.3 (in fi ne) (actio de recepto?) that both 
actions were received. See specifi cally Master of Forbes v Steil (1678) Mor 9233. But I agree that the 
placing of the action directly following deposit suggests that the institutional writers faced structural 
complexities in classifying this action and eventually decided to group it with the contract of deposit. 
This choice had a profound impact upon the later development of the action.
24 This was probably a consequence of locating this action with the contract of deposit. This emphasised 
the element of “receiving” = deposit, rather than the guarantee upon which the Roman law action was 
founded.
25 Zimmermann & Simpson (n 14) at 572-578.
26 Zimmermann & Simpson (n 14) at 581-582.
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C. ASSESSMENT
It is diffi cult to know whether the sheriff principal’s decision was correct, since many 
of the salient legal points were left unexplored. The essence of the court’s refusal to 
entertain the pursuer’s claim was that it judged Castlehill B&B to be a lodging house 
(based on the pursuer’s length of stay). The court was not convinced by Erskine’s state-
ment that the edict applied to such establishments, or by the precedent upon which 
he had relied. The sheriff principal also founded on the reservations expressed in later 
institutional writing and in modern commentaries on the applicability of the edict to 
lodging houses.
With that said, however, the issue of the lodging house remains somewhat baffl ing.27 
There is no evidence that the distinction between an inn and a lodging house ever 
featured in juristic discussion on the actio de recepto in Roman law. The only instance 
where the act of lodging seems to have been of importance was in the action on theft 
against nautae, caupones, stabularii. The reason was that the innkeeper was held liable 
for theft committed by his staff or by those who lodged there (qui habitandi causa ibi 
sunt).28 He was not held liable for theft perpetrated by passing travellers.29 The issue 
of the distinction between an inn and a lodging house seems to have arisen in Scots 
law during the period of the institutional writers when various extensions of the appli-
cability of the Edict occurred.30 It was fi rst raised in May v Wingate31 (the case cited 
by Erskine), where the court decided, without giving reasons, that a lodging house was 
similar to an inn. Although the true reason for this decision will probably only come to 
light once the papers of the case are investigated, it can be pointed out that if the court 
argued upon a strictly “Roman” view of the actio de recepto, the decision would make 
perfect sense; for the nature of the establishment was irrelevant to an action based 
on strict liability. The purpose of this extension to lodging houses in May v Wingate, 
and the question of how the issues of the length of stay or the innkeeper’s control over 
those who lodge with him relate to this exclusion, remain to be fully explored. It is a 
pity that these matters were not investigated more carefully.
Two further points deserve mention. First, the court’s statement,32 “whatever may 
have been the position in 1694 or 1800, it cannot now be affi rmed …  that it is the 
law of Scotland …”, is surprising and unexpected. One might have thought that the 
whole point of having a living “common law” in the institutional writers is to allow for 
an assessment of existing law in light of its history. The court’s statement is not only 
27 Compare T B Smith, A Short Commentary on the Law of Scotland (1962) 636.
28 D 47.5.1.6.
29 Walker, Delict (n 2) 291, relying on English case law, shows that the defi nition of an inn according to 
English law was linked to the notion of delectus personae. The proprietor of an inn admitted all members 
of the public, while that of a lodging house had a greater degree of choice over his clientele. Cf Bankton’s 
description of the English law on this point in Inst I.16 at 380-382. There seems to be a link with D 
47.5.1.6: “nam viatorem sibi eligere caupo vel stabularius non videtur nec repellere potest iter agentes: 
inhabitatores vero perpetuos ipse quodammodo elegit, qui non reiecit, quorum factum oportet eum 
praestare.”
30 None of the institutional writers defi nes an inn nor does the matter seem to have provoked discussion 
in case law during the institutional period.
31 (1684) Mor 9233.
32 Para 25.
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badly informed, but also undermines the historical continuum upon which modern 
Scots private law is founded.
Secondly, the court’s decision not to take account of a recent South African case, 
Gabriel v Enchanted Bed and Breakfast CC,33 deserves comment. Admittedly, the 
sheriff principal was unable to obtain a copy of the case, but the statement that34 “…it 
is one thing to say that the Edict applies to a bed and breakfast establishment in South 
Africa and quite another to say that it applies to a similar establishment in Scotland …” 
underplays the potential usefulness of South African case law.35 Had the court taken 
the time to acquire the case in question, it would have seen that the facts were quite 
similar. The case dealt with the actio de recepto in the Roman sense as introduced into 
South African law via Roman-Dutch law. Strict liability based on the praetorian edict 
was confi rmed in an earlier case, Davis v Lockstone.36 Although South African law 
does not appear to have been infl uenced by the contract of deposit in the same way as 
in Scotland, there are suffi cient parallels to be drawn from this mixed jurisdiction to 
warrant fruitful comparison.
Of course, the future of this action in Scots law depends on whether circum-
stances still warrant its existence. It does seem harsh to hold an innkeeper, or for that 
matter the proprietor of a B & B, strictly liable in respect of goods which are brought 
into the establishment and then damaged or stolen by a third party. On the other hand, 
Ulpian’s rationalisation for the existence of the action, namely that “it is necessary 
generally to trust these persons and deliver property into their custody”,37 still holds 
true today. If the action is indeed based on some type of “guarantee” to keep the goods 




33 2002 (6) SA 597.
34 Para 28.
35 Indeed the private law of the two jurisdictions has recently been the subject of detailed comparative 
study: see R Zimmermann, D Visser and K Reid (eds), Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective: 
Property and Obligations in Scotland and South Africa (2004).
36 1958 AD 153.
37 D 4.9.1.
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